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The Age of ‘Depoliticisation’ and 
‘Dejuridification’ 
and its ‘Logic of Assembling’: An Essay 
Against the Instrumentalist Use of 
Comparative Law’s Geopolitics 
DR. LUCA SILIQUINI-CINELLI* 
Abstract While comparative law has become a key discipline, its 
instrumentalist use has turned out to be a powerful weapon: it is the 
‘pen’ by which the identity of and differences in law’s geopolitics are 
continually written and rewritten. Given its attractive functionalist es-
sence, comparative law is gaining increasing international credit as a 
way of developing newer theories of sovereignty and governance in a 
framework in which law is conceived of less as a set of rules and more 
as a symbolic vestimentum of global soft power. The present contribu-
tion critically investigates the relationship between distortive views of 
comparative law’s geopolitics and the intimate essence of the doctrine 
aimed at creating the ‘aspatial’, unbounded, illimitable (and hence in-
tangible) liberal global order whose governance appears to transcend the 
idea and form(s) of law through which the ‘politicization’ and ‘juridifi-
cation’ of modernity have been achieved in the last century. In doing so, 
it also addresses why such an alliance has made it easier to ‘discover’ 
 
* This contribution is based on a paper that I presented on September 19, 2014 at the Graduate 
Legal Research Conference Divergence and Dissent in Legal Globalization, held by Católica 
Global Law School (CGLS), Lisbon, and that I am due to present on October 25, 2014, at the 
Conference De-juridification: Appearance and Disappearance of Law at a Time of Crisis, IVR 
International Association of Legal and Social Philosophy, UK Branch, held at the Law Depart-
ment, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). I would like to thank José Lobo 
Moutinho, Jan Dalhuisen, Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro, and Tito Rendas for inviting me to CGLS, 
and Maksymilian Del Mar, Massimo Renzo, and Emmanuel Melissaris, who generously invited 
me to LSE. I am also indebted to the participants at both conferences who provided me with criti-
cally constructive comments, and to the editors of The Loyola of Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Review for their assistance throughout the publication process. I am particular-
ly grateful to Danuta Mendelson for her valuable comments on an earlier draft.  
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and ‘sell’ the smooth and rectilinear land of the figuratively unspoken 
and unwritten as the terra incognita that lies over what is created by the 
constructivist political intervention(s) of the modern nation-state. 
Keywords Global order; geopolitics, comparative law; legal 
scholarship; political theology 
‘Hen kai pan!’ 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing 
1780 
 
“[T]hat men can use their own knowledge in the pursuit of their 
own ends without colliding with each other 
only if clear boundaries can be drawn between their respective 
domains of free action, 
is the basis on which all known civilization has grown.” 
Friedrich Hayek 
Law, Legislation and Liberty, [1973] 2013, 102 
 
“[B]ut if ‘openness’ itself can result in the paralysis of the open-
ness, 
then we are dealing with self-destruction.” 
Leszek Kolakowski 
Modernity on Endless Trial, 1990, 162 
 
“To reject the biological and symbolic dimension [of the law] 
leads to [the] insanity of treating humans 
as mere animals or as pure mind, subject to no limits that are not 
self-imposed.” 
Alain Supiot 
Homo Juridicus, 2007 (2005), ix 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with the essence and perils of what I will 
define as the instrumentalist use of comparative law’s geopolitics. Its 
main claim is that this is an age in which the definition of the space by 
which law makes itself ontologically representable and tangible through 
its ‘annunciation’ is instrumentally manipulated by internal and external 
forces simultaneously. Yet it could be noted that this has always been 
the case in the West. As will emerge in due course, this contention 
would surely be correct. However, what contradistinguishes the current 
de-juridification of law’s regulative instances is the scale that the phe-
nomenon has reached, as well as its post-historical and post-political es-
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sence.1 A powerful example of this is the impact on both political and 
comparative legal theory of the liberal doctrine aimed at creating the 
“aspatial,” unlimited, unbounded, and hence ontologically intangible 
economic global order. The World Trade Organization (WTO), the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank have been ac-
tively working on this since the late 1990s. This doctrine’s final goal is 
the formal “depoliticisation” and “dejuridification” of the world. I have 
discussed this neutralizing trend elsewhere.2 
Delving into this framework from a different, yet complementary, 
perspective, in this paper I criticize the liberal global-order project and 
the instrumentalist use of both political and comparative legal reasoning 
which supports it. In doing so, I investigate the threat posed by the crea-
tion of this totalizing dimension3 for both the Schmittian “political” and 
“sovereign,” and for the rule of law.4 
Section II begins with the description of the essence and features 
of universalized liberalism, its “logic of assembling” in Legendrian 
terms, and its implications for both political and legal theory. Section III 
explores why jurists (having been defined as the militia legum by Bal-
dus5) found themselves deprived of the role of guardians of law’s un-
canny presence because of the positivistic dicta of the artificial Levia-
than that rendered “law” synonymous with “legislation.” Consequently, 
attention is paid to the reasons why a great deal of comparative legal 
scholarship is trying to reclaim its leading role by influencing and sup-
porting the post-national, anti-state policies that perceive the delibera-
tive law-making process (brought about by the French Revolution and 
its constructivist rationalism in Hayekian terms) as the obstacle to over-
come, and the “cohabitation” of different national legal systems as the 
problem to be solved. In this paper I also explain why the success of the 
liberal global order doctrine is related to the global “aspatial turn” that 
legal and sociopolitical theories are undergoing, which is overcoming 
the classic idea of “space” as a “representative surface.” The conclusive 
 
 1. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Hayek the Schmittian, Contextualising Cristi’s Account of Hay-
ek’s Decisionism in the Age of Global Wealth Inequality, 24GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 
2015). 
 2. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, ‘Against Interpretation?’ On Global (Non-)Law, the Breaking-up 
of Homo Juridicus and the Disappearance of the Jurist, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD., (forthcoming 2015).  
 3. See ANDREW HURRELL, ON GLOBAL ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 184 (2007). 
 4. For an introduction to the Schmittian political and sovereign, see CARL SCHMITT, 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 63 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 2005) (1922) [hereinafter POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY].) 
 5. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL 
POLITICAL THEORY 124 (Princeton Univ. Press 1957).   
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remarks are dedicated to the paradoxes of the instrumentalist and ma-
nipulative use of comparative law’s geopolitics. 
II. THE LIBERAL GLOBAL ORDER PROJECT, ITS LEGENDARIAN “LOGIC OF 
ASSEMBLING”AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE SCHMITTIAN “POLITICAL” 
AND “SOVEREIGN” 
The first claim of this paper is that, in this current period in the 
West, law is profoundly transformed by internal and global external 
forces simultaneously. Additionally, the definition of the space by 
which it makes itself ontologically representable and tangible through 
its signification is continuously manipulated for practical purposes. 
This is not surprising. The West, as we know it today, is the prod-
uct of an instrumentalist use of Western logic of memory, historicity of 
politics, and sociology of law. As a comparatist, I am profoundly inter-
ested in the postmodern and neorealist phases of this phenomenon and, 
in particular, the role that the instrumentalist use of comparative law’s 
geopolitics plays in its current development. 
It is my suggestion that the contemporary deliberative manipula-
tion of comparative law and legal reasoning is intrinsically related to the 
doctrine that the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, have been actively work-
ing since the late 1990s that is aimed at creating an “aspatial,” bound-
less, illimitable, and intangible global order based on a scheme of intel-
ligibility opposed to that of the modern nation-state. In particular, 
through what Legendre defined as the “logic of assembling,”6 which in-
evitably implies an a priori deconstruction, the liberal global order pro-
ject is imposing the sterile, instrumentalist ufficium of global govern-
ance on us. This supra-national dicta aims at the mere administration of 
the world and transcends the idea and form(s) of law through which the 
“politicization” and “juridification” of modernity was achieved in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.7 
Bearing in mind Kolakowski’s inquiry into the perils of the liberal 
model of the ‘open society’,8 it is reasonable to argue that, (notwith-
standing Hayek’s account of the necessity of boundaries to preserve the 
legal order)9 the global Oikoumene scheme is ultimately based on liber-
 
 6. PIERRE LEGENDRE, L’OCCIDENTE INVISIBILE 41 (Medusa Edizioni ed., Paolo Heritier 
trans. 2009) (2004). 
 7. I therefore do not agree with Cohen’s vision of a ‘dualistic’ global order. See JEAN L 
COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
 8. LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MODERNITY ON ENDLESS TRIAL 162–75 (Univ. of Chi. Press 
1998). 
 9. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 101–05 (Univ. of Chi. Press et al. 
1973). 
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alism’s (and, thus, romanticism’s)10 political sin, as expressed by Ha-
bermas’s early work and Ackerman’s expectations11 –the belief that its 
endless negotiations can always be inclusive.12 This is constantly im-
plemented through the deliberative, instrumentalist and revolutionary 
use of law’s geopolitics as imposed by the French Revolution and its 
constructivist rationalism.13 The Schmittian ‘sovereign’ is displaced 
from this view, and not capable of any concrete intervention.14 The re-
cently renewed interest in theories suggesting that governments should 
cut their debt by selling their political and economic assets is testament 
to this15 and makes it evident the extent reached by the ‘civilized econ-
omy’ and ‘good economic governance’ models.16 
There is, however, a mistake and a paradox in this view. The mis-
take, as Paul W. Kahn correctly notes, is “to think that law without sov-
 
 10. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL ROMANTICISM xvii (Guy Oakes trans., Transaction Publish-
ers 1986) [hereinafter POLITICAL ROMANTICISM]. 
 11. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (Yale Univ. Press 1980); 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Christian Len-
hardt & Shierry Nicholsen trans. 1983); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORM: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 
MIT Press 1996). 
 12. PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN 53-60 (Princeton Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter OUT OF 
EDEN]; PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 175 (Columbia Univ. Press 2012); PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS 
PLACE 37 (2006); POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 4, at 63.  In a quite approximate and unsatis-
factory way, Schmitt, who was a (if not the) leading jurist and political theorist in Germany dur-
ing the period after World War I, will always be remembered for his associations with the Na-
tional Socialists (he joined the party in 1933 and left it in 1936), the prelude to which was the 
publication in 1921, of Die Diktatur, in which he argued in favour of commissarial forms of dic-
tatorship to deal with extraordinary circumstances. For a compelling inquiry into the relationship 
that Schmitt had with the Nazi party, see POLITICAL ROMANTICISM, supra note 10, at ix–xxxv.  
To understand the growing interest in Schmitt’s thought, see Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Legal Sys-
temology and the Geopolitics of Roman Law: A Response to Stuart Elden’s Critique of Carl 
Schmitt’s Spatial Ontology, 1 PÓLEMOS J.L. LIT. & CULTURE, (forthcoming 2015).  
 13. David Dessler & John Owen, Constructivism and the Problem of Explanation: A Review 
Article, 3 PERSPECT.  POLIT. 597, 604 (2005). 
 14. Id.  
 15. According to the IMF, non-financial assets such as land, subsoil resources, and buildings 
in the countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are 
worth around $35 trillion. Additionally, state-owned enterprises are worth around $2 trillion, and 
there is a further $2 trillion in local government utilities and/or assets.  For a discussion of the 
foregoing, see The $9 Trillion Sale, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21593453-governments-should-launch-new-wave-
privatisations-time-centred-property-9; Setting Out the Store, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21593458/comments.  The predomination of economics over 
ideology and politics on the European continent is revealed, for instance, by the fact that in 2013, 
Euro-area governments were required for the first time to submit national budgets to the Europe-
an Commission for judgment before final submission to national parliaments.  
 16. Siliquini-Cinelli, supra note 2. 
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ereignty . . . has solved the problem of perpetuating its own existence.”17 
The paradox is that, notwithstanding the mystifying soft nature of uni-
versalized liberalism as expressed by its administrative, rather than ju-
ristic and political essence, its effects are anything but legally neutral or 
apolitical. 
Elsewhere,18 I have asserted that the postmodern and neorealist 
phases of what I define as the “Europeanisation of Europe” and its trag-
ic “statelessness fantasy” are nothing more than the continental para-
digm of this project, and its current proof. In the same context, I also 
claimed that standard approaches to pluralist, insulated channels of 
post-national governance (“PNG”) fall short in providing the theoretical 
and practical elements that we need to understand why PNG is also the 
instrument used by the promoters of the intangible liberal global order. 
To overcome these limitations, I maintained that any study of the es-
sence, structures, aims, challenges, and limitations of PNG should also 
investigate how this particular law functions (that is, how it makes itself 
visible and ontologically tangible through the process of its signification 
to become the law). This necessity is related to the fact that PNG is 
characterized, in my opinion, by the transcendence of Carl Schmitt’s 
“nomos der Erde,” which was about taking, sharing, and dividing spac-
es and resources in order to make forms of power and domain publicly 
visible.19 
So the question arises: why are the breaking up of Homo juridi-
cus20 and the formally apolitical administrative ufficium of global gov-
ernance taking place? Because the increasing predominance of econom-
 
 17. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 12 at 56. 
 18. I have discussed this further in “Escaping the Cage: Why the Implementation of Plural-
ist, Insulated Forms of Post-National Subsidiary Governance Might Represent the Only Solution 
to the European Crises” paper presented at the 6th CEE Forum for Young Legal, Political and 
Social Theorists, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb in May 2014, and in “The Lure of Post-
National European Private Law as a Semi-Stateless Scheme of Intelligibility: A ‘Multi-Layered’, 
‘Inter-Institutional’, ‘Networked’ Order or a ‘Semi-Hierarchical’ Nomos?” paper presented at the 
Law in a Changing Transnational World – A Workshop for Young Scholars, hosted in October 
2013 by The Zvi Meitar Center For Advanced Legal Studies at The Buchmann Faculty of Law, 
Tel Aviv University. 
 19. The Greek term nomos is derived from another Greek term, nemein, which, depending 
on the context, means ‘to divide’, to pasture’, ‘to distribute’, or ‘to posses’. See CARL SCHMITT, 
THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPEAUM 67 
(Gary Ulmen trans., Telos Publ’g Press 2006) (1950). 
 20. See ALAIN SUPIOT, HOMO JURIDICUS: ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE 
LAW (Saskia Brown, trans., Verso 2007); Peter Goodrich, Intersititium and Non-Law, 
in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 213, 215 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012) [hereinafter 
Intersititium and Non-Law]; Peter Goodrich, Law’s Labour’s Lost, 72 MOD. L. REV. 296, 298 
(2009).  I have discussed this further in ‘Against Interpretation?’, supra note 2. 
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ics over politics, that is to say, the economic structure determines the 
political and legal one.21 This seems to be confirmed, in Muir Watt’s 
words, by the current “loss of relevance of territory in global econo-
my.”22 More precisely, as Mazzucato writes, “[I]n most parts of the 
world we are witnessing a massive withdrawal of the State, one that has 
been justified in terms of debt reduction and – perhaps more systemati-
cally – in terms of rendering the economy more ‘dynamic’, ‘competi-
tive’ and ‘innovative’.”23 Yet it would be unforgivable not to specify 
that the process of dissolving the spatiality of identity, sensibility, and 
culture through the fight against the political and legal leading role of 
the sovereign nation-state is primarily related to the historico-
geographical lesson(s) taught by modern capitalism.24 In this sense, it 
should be noted that the map of domination of the world’s representa-
tive spaces changed in the period between 1850 and 1914, after the rev-
olutionary upsurge of 1848 that followed the depression sweeping out 
of Britain in 1846–1847.25 The words of Alfred Marshall (“the influence 
of time is more fundamental than that of space”26), as well as Émile Zo-
la’s La Terre, and De Chirico’s paintings of 1910–14 (specifically, The 
Philosopher’s Conquest), and Martin Heidegger’s The Thing and The 
Question Concerning Technology are testament to this. Stephen Kern 
asked in his The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918, what modern-
ism is, if not the response to a crisis in the experience of space and 
time.27 Paraphrasing Kern’s words, we should ask what (in our neoreal-
ist global age and in the wake of the fall of the postmodern “bipolar sys-
tem”) the role of economics plays in influencing the essence and spatial-
ity of law’s geopolitics in terms of cultural signification.28  As Marx 
 
 21. Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 INT’L 
ORG. 595, 596-97 (1995). 
 22. Horatia Muir Watt, On the Waning Magic of Territoriality in the Conflict of Law, 
in TOM BINGHAM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LAW: A LIBER AMICORUM 751 (Mads 
Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
 23. MARIANNA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING THE PUBLIC VS. 
PRIVATE MYTH IN RISK AND INNOVATION 1 (Anthem Press 2013); see also SUPIOT, supra note 
20, at 100-09, 145-84. 
 24. See DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 263 (Blackwell Publishing 
1989) (writing that Gustave Flaubert explored “the question of representation of heterogeneity 
and difference, of simultaneity and synchrony, in a world where both and space are being ab-
sorbed under the homogenizing power of money and commodity exchange.”) See also DAVID 
HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL: AND THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM (Profile Books 2010) 
[hereinafter THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL]. 
 25. HARVEY, supra note 24, at 263-64. 
 26. Id. at 265. 
 27. See Generally STEPHEN KERN, THE CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE 11 (Harvard Univ. 
Press ed. 1983). 
 28. Id.  
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commented, the question is why and how the economic structure deter-
mines the political one.29 
The relevance of my proposed analysis is made evident by the con-
tent of the Doing Business reports of 2004 and 2005.30 The WTO mem-
bers partly used these reports at the ninth ministerial conference, held in 
Bali in December 2013, to sign the first comprehensive agreement since 
the WTO was founded, involving an effort to simplify (rectius, dis-
solve) the procedures for doing business across borders and redesign the 
economic geography of the world market.31 In writing the Doing Busi-
ness series, the WTO, IMF, and World Bank called for the adoption of a 
modus procedendi that perceives (the) law as nothing more than an 
aspatial normative framework in which the only benchmarks that should 
be considered relevant are the legal sources, rules of interpretation, and 
the courts’ organization. Furthermore, by adopting the “Law and Fi-
nance” approach promoted by Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine, which 
refers to the Economic Analysis of Law,32 the Doing Business reports 
effectively asserted that the competition among different legal systems 
is ultimately won by those more capable of protecting institutional 
global investors by (also) reducing market(s’) costs. Lastly, because 
Civil law systems tend to create institutions that implement the state’s 
power33, the Doing Business reports suggested that such a result is best 
achieved and protected by Common law systems.34 The “efficiency test” 
 
 29. Id.  
 30. See INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV./THE WORLD BANK, DOING 
BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH (World Bank, Int’l Fin. Corp., & Oxford 
Univ. Press 2005), available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB05-FullReport.pdf.  
 31. The deal was the first ‘success’ of the Doha Round. The full package could add about 
$1trillion to world trade by cutting the cost of shipping goods around the world by more than 10 
percent, raising global output by over $400 billion a year and giving developing nations more 
scope to increase farm subsidies. (NC HERE) For a recent inquiry into how global economic 
governance issues determine the trajectory of national politics, see Daniel D Bradlow, A Frame-
work for Assessing Global Economic Governance, 36 B. C. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 971, 971-73 
(2013). To understand why the IMF and the World Bank are buffeted by institutional crisis and 
policy conflicts, see WALDEN BELLO, CAPITALISM’S LAST STAND? 181–202 (Zed Books 2013). 
 32. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development, (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10126, 2003),available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10126. 
 33. For example, Common law systems promote a more market-centered political economy 
than Civil law systems.  See John C. Reitz, Comparative Law and Political Economy, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 105, 126-27 (David S. Clark ed., Edward Elgar Publ’g., 2012). 
 34. I use capital ‘C’ to refer to the Common law as a legal tradition. Common (with an up-
percase c) law and common law are two different things: while the former is a legal tradition 
marked by a number of particular characteristics, the latter refers to only a part of the Common 
law (and includes elements of both case law and customary law). 
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adopted by both reports and according to which “wealth maximization 
becomes an explanation of the development of the (common law)”35 
make it clear that Gunter Teubner is wrong when he claims that global 
law “is a law whose ‘centre’ is created by the ‘peripheries’ and remains 
dependent on them.”36 Importantly, both reports have been vehemently 
criticized by the French Capitant Report, published in 2006, because of 
their limited and superficial purview of enquiry and obvious paradoxes 
(e.g., it was argued that Anglo-American law is inevitably classist, and 
that, as Monateri pointed out, the “Law and Finance” doctrine is noth-
ing more than “inverted Marxism”).37 
The French critique should be taken into serious account. Despite 
what may be suggested to the contrary, according to the WTO, IMF, 
and World Bank, the solution for rendering economies more “dynamic,” 
“competitive,” and “innovative” does not come from the implementa-
tion of the rule of law through its local representations and ways of le-
gitimation and recognition.38 Rather, the solution is the dissolution of 
the “spatiality” of the targeted legal systems (and identity of cultures 
underneath) and the essence of the “political” in Schmittian terms. 39 
Such a process is evidently part of the movement towards theories 
of (non-) sovereignty and governance in a global framework in which 
law is not only perceived as a set of rules, but also a relevant symbolic 
vestimentum of global soft power.40 The substitution of local govern-
 
 35. Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi, Comparative Law and Economics: Accounting for 
Social Norms, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 92, 93 (Edward Elgar Publ’g., 2012). 
 36. Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL 
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 12 (Gunter Teubner ed., Brookfield 1997). 
 37. PIER MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO 27-34 (2013) as translated by the author. 
 38. Id. at 27-28. 
 39. See id. at 54-56.  
 40. See id. at 26-27. Scholarship on the global governance issue seems endless. For an intro-
duction, see JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS, AND GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2009); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD 
ORDER (Princeton Univ. Press 2004); Julian Arato, Constitutionality and Constitutionalism Be-
yond the State: Two Perspectives on the Material Constitution of the United Nations, 10 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 627 (2012); Maksymilian Del Mar, Beyond the State in and of Legal Theory, in 
CONCEPTS OF LAW: COMPARATIVE, JURISPRUDENTIAL, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 19-
41 (Seàn Patrick Donlan & Lukas Heckendorn-Urscheler eds., Ashgate 2014); Nils Jansen & Ralf 
Michaels, Beyond the State? Rethinking Private Law: Introduction to the Issue, 56 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 527 (2008); Nico Krisch, Global Governance as Public Authority: an Introduction, 10 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 976 (2012); Nicole Roughan, The Relative Authority of Law: A Contribution to “Plu-
ralist Jurisprudence”, in NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 254 (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); 
CHARLES F. SABEL & JONATHAN ZEITLIN, EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE (Oxford Univ. Press 2010); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Filling Power Vacuums in the Global Legal Order, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 919 (2013); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
283 (2004); Bas van der Vossen, Legitimacy and Multi-Level Governance, in NEW WAVES IN 
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ment with aspatial global governance is what we should delve into if we 
are to understand that what the liberal global-order project renders in-
significant is the Schmittian “exception” together with the related notion 
of sovereign and democratic “friend/enemy” (or “us/them”) antithesis 
which makes politics possible.41 In this sense, the recent referendum in 
which Switzerland decided to bring back strict immigration quotas for 
Europeans may be seen as a tentative step towards rediscovering the 
(democratic) significance of the democratic “friend/enemy” antithesis, 
and hence of politics, as opposed to the sterile administrative vacuum 
promoted by the universalization of liberal thought and Europe’s (trag-
ic) “statelessness fantasy.”42 
That the West is not capable of understanding the perils of this 
progression should not surprise anyone. While questioning the delusion 
of those holding Western values, Samuel P. Huntington claimed, 
“Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three 
problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous.”43 He then main-
tained that these problems are directly related to what he defined as the 
“global identity crisis.”44 He was right. Yet his claim can only be fully 
understood if we bear in mind that Western civilization long ago 
stopped delving into the question of its identity and, through the adop-
tion and incessant implementation of a deliberatively shaped set of con-
cepts, has always experienced the instrumentalist and manipulative 
creation, disruption, and recreation of its memory.45 This means that the 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 233-53 (Maksymilian Del Mar ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2011); Peer 
Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 191 (2007).  
 41. According to Schmitt, to decide is to decide both for and against and inevitably implies 
the predominance of will over reason.  See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26-
27 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (1927) [hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL]. Similarly, 
Derrida claimed that “[n]o justice is exercised, no justice is rendered, no justice becomes effective 
nor does it determine itself in the form of law, without a decision that cuts and divides.” Jacques 
Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, in ACTS OF RELIGION 230, 252 
(Gil Anidjar ed., Routledge 2010). 
 42. See Luca Siliquini-Cinelli and Bétrice Schütte, Conceptualizing the Schmittian Excep-
tion in the European Union: From ‘Opt-out’ Procedure(s), to Indirect Forms of Secessionism, 15 
CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, 1 (2015). 
 43. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF 
WORLD ORDER 310 (Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
 44. Id. at 125. 
 45. The (sad) circumstance that the West has lost faith in the traditions and memories that 
have made it and its principles “have been falling into increasing disregard and oblivion” is the 
canon of Hayek’s inquiry into the constitution of liberty. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 1-8 (Routledge 2006) (1960). The most striking evidence of this 
phenomenon is that, paradoxically, the West does not even have geopolitical boundaries and thus 
cannot be properly defined in terms of “west” either. That the ontological disposition of Western 
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West, as we know it today, is the result of the literary reinterpretation 
and voluntary distortion of its historicity of politics and sociology of 
law for practical purposes.46 In particular, the West has been built on 
 
(non-)culture has shifted from the Greece of Thucydides to the U.S. and, in part, the Eastern side 
of the Southern hemisphere is testament to this. On the (non-)identity of the West, see generally 
the monumental investigation conducted in MARTIN BERNAL, BLACK ATHENA: AFROASIATIC 
ROOTS OF CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION (Rutgers Univ. Press, 1987); see also SAMUEL ANGUS, THE 
MYSTERY-RELIGIONS AND CHRISTIANITY: A STUDY IN THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF EARLY 
CHRISTIANITY (Dover 1975) (1928); HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND (1978); ALEIDA 
ASSMAN, CULTURAL MEMORY AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION (2011); JAN ASSMANN, MOSES THE 
EGYPTIAN: THE MEMORY OF EGYPT IN WESTERN MONOTHEISM (Harvard Univ. Press, 1998) 
[herinafter MOSES THE EGYPTIAN]; JAN ASSMANN, THE PRICE OF MONOTHEISM (2010) [herein-
after THE PRICE OF MONOTHEISM]; JAN ASSMANN, CULTURAL MEMORY AND EARLY 
CIVILIZATION:  WRITING, REMEMBRANCE, AND POLITICAL IMAGINATION (2011) [hereinafter 
CULTURAL MEMORY AND EARLY CIVILIZATION]; JAN ASSMANN, RELIGIO DUPLEX:  HOW THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT REINVENTED EGYPTIAN RELIGION (2014); MARTIN BERNAL, BLACK ATHENA 
WRITES BACK (Duke Univ. Press 2006); ERIC BERNE, BEYOND GAMES AND SCRIPTS (1976); 
JONATHAN BOYARIN, REMAPPING MEMORY: THE POLITICS OF TIMESPACE (1994); FRANCIS M 
CORNFORD, FROM RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY (Dover 2004) (1912); FRANZ V. M CUMONT, 
ORIENTAL RELIGIONS IN ROMAN PAGANISM (Echo Library 2008) (1911); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, 
WHO ARE WE? (2004); PERSONAL IDENTITY (John Perry ed., 1975); MARY L. LEFKOWITZ & 
GUY M. ROGERS, BLACK ATHENA REVISITED (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1996); DAN P. 
MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE LIVE BY: PERSONAL MYTHS AND THE MAKING OF THE SELF (1st 
ed. 1993); W.O.E  OESTERLEY & THEODORE H. ROBINSON, HEBREW RELIGION:  ITS 
DEVELOPMENT AND ORIGIN (1930); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1st ed. 
1993); MICHAEL ALAN SIGNER, MEMORY AND HISTORY IN CHRISTIANITY AND JUDAISM (2001); 
ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGIN OF NATIONS (B. Blackwell, 1986); SIR WILLIAM W. 
TARN & G.T. GRIFFITH, HELLENISTIC CIVILIZATION (Edward Arnold Pub. Ltd. 1966); CHARLES 
TAYLOR, THE MALAISE OF MODERNITY (1991); VICTOR TCHERIKOVER, HELLENISTIC 
CIVILIZATION AND THE JEWS (Baker Publishing) (1959); JAMES TULLY, STRANGE 
MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995); BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
PROBLEMS OF THE SELF:  PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956-1972 (1973); Michael S Roth, We Are 
What We Remember, TIKKUN MAGAZINE (Nov/Dec. 1994) available at 
http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/nov1994_roth;  
 46. Unfortunately, the scope of our study does not allow us to delve into this topic adequate-
ly. Yet the instrumentalist use of the ‘exception’ within the Christian creed is of particular interest 
here. Although Jesus emphasized the moral side of life in preference to the purely formal aspect 
of legal observance, he is never shown in conflict with current practice of the law. The single ex-
ception is the plucking of heads of grain on the Sabbath (see Luke 6:1-5). Yet, as David Flusser 
correctly writes, “[t]he general opinion was that on the Sabbath it was permissible to pick up fall-
en heads of grain and rub them between the fingers. According to Rabbi Yehuda, also a Galilean, 
it was even permissible to rub them in one’s hand.” DAVID FLUSSER, JESUS 58 (Hebrew Univ. 
Magnes Press 3rd ed. 2001) (1968). It is clear that the essence of the manipulative distortion came 
from Jesus’s disciples, who wrote the (no longer extant) documents in Hebrew; these were trans-
lated into Greek for the Alexandrian Jews, and then further elaborated through various stages of 
redaction until finally being employed by the Synoptic evangelists. In order to make the scene 
more vivid, the Synoptic evangelists added the statement about plucking the wheat as the act of 
transgression that confirmed Jesus’s superior authority. Both this (unreal) episode and the “divine 
conflict” between God and the crucified Jesus as described in Moltmann’s The Crucified God 
may be considered as the first Schmittian state of exception in political theology, from which 
Christianity, and hence the West as we know it today, originated. See ‘Against Interpretation?’, 
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(and promoted through) memories that have always been seen as true 
because they were instrumentally arranged by their guardians. Hence, 
these memories are anything but “true” in absolute terms: as Jan and 
Aleida Assmann have persuasively claimed,47 they just have to be kept 
alive as “pure and genuine memories”, independent from any historio-
graphical legitimation (mnemohistory).48 
This fanatic trend of Machiavellian creation, abolition, and change 
of the Western logic of memory forces us to ask ourselves on what basis 
the West knows itself and produces (and sells) its own cultural, sociopo-
litical and ontological image (or test, as Legendre would say49). Answer-
ing this question is not an easy task for at least two reasons. First, we 
live in a period in which even the topological and topographical notions, 
and local sensibility of presentification of the West, or of the values it 
promotes, are unclear. Second, the introduction of Christianity into Eu-
rope, and its further Hellenization and theologization,50 produced the 
first major (violent and exceptional51) discontinuity in the Western evo-
lution of both law and politics as they emerged from tribal social cus-
toms. 
Only when we consider the blurriness of this scenario and unite it 
with history’s lessons about law’s need for spatial signifiers that the 
threat posed by the formal “depoliticization” and “dejuridification” of 
the world to the rule of law (which is a doctrine and not, as it may be 
contrarily suggested, a principle52) becomes evident. Seeing that the 
Oikoumene is characterized by the uniformity of politics, culture, and 
legislation, it may not be considered a territory in spatio-ontological 
 
supra note 2. 
 47. See generally JAN ASSMANN, MOSES THE EGYPTIAN, supra note 45; THE PRICE OF 
MONOTHEISM, supra note 45; CULTURAL MEMORY AND EARLY CIVILIZATION, supra note 45. 
 48. The first historian who addressed the extinguishing of the individual through the experi-
ence of alienation of the historical consciousness was Leopold von Ranke. See Hans-Georg Gad-
amer, The Universality of the Hermenuetical Problem, in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 32 
(David E. Linge ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 2004) (1996). To understand how history has altered its 
position in relation to the document by making it a ‘monument’ through which memories are de-
liberatively promoted, see generally MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
(Routledge 2002) (1969). 
 49. Culture, according to Legendre, is the construction of a discourse, and its memory de-
pends on our use of the geology of its texts. See Legendre, supra note 6. 
 50. For an introduction on the sociopolitical perspective of this topic, see generally FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER (Profile Books 2012). The Jewish simplicity, 
which still characterizes the Synoptic Gospels, disappears in John’s identification of Christ with 
the Stoic-Platonic logos (see Gospel of John, 1:1). The same applies to the Pauline epistles, which 
are widely recognized as the true ‘seed’ of Christianity.  
 51. See GEORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 52-64 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. 
Press 2005) (2003). 
 52. MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO, supra note 37. 
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terms and, consequently, there is no need in it for a nomos in terms of 
“division,” “allocation,” and “appropriation” (Nahme) of rights, inter-
ests, obligations, and duties.53 Lord Bingham’s lessons on the intrinsic 
relationship between the rule of law and the modern democratic state 
seem to confirm this suggestion.54 Hence, to understand the “dissipation 
of the rule of law into the self-regulation of transnational corporations”55 
– that is, into a soft-networked (non-) dimension in which time and 
space do not exist – we should first understand that, as Kafka, Derrida, 
and Cacciari have persuasively demonstrated, the law can perform its 
regulative instances only when (and due to the fact that) the subject 
does not enter its open door. Given that it is ontologically impossible to 
enter the “open,” the effectiveness of the legal order (also) depends on 
the ontological and anthropological constitutive force of the boundary.56  
 
 53. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 88-90 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1998) (1958); 
HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 179-186 (Penguin 2006) (1963); CARL SCHMITT, THE 
NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPEAUM (Gary 
Ulmen trans., Telos Publishing Press 2006) (1950); Carl Schmitt, Großraum Versus Universal-
ism, in SPATIALITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND CARL SCHMITT 3 (Stephen Legg ed., Matthew Hannah 
trans. Routledge 2013).  For a compelling investigation into the implications for the development 
of Western philosophy of the manipulative distortion of the term oikonomia, see GIORGIO 
AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY: FOR A THEOLOGICAL GENEALOGY OF ECONOMY 
AND GOVERNMENT (Lorenzo Chiesa trans., Matteo Mandarini trans., 2011); ANDREA 
CAVALLETTI, LA CITTÀ BIOPOLITICA: MITOLOGIE DELLA SICUREZZA (2005). Finally, for a 
comparison between the economic global order and the infinite order of Hell, see GIORGIO 
AGAMBEN, CHURCH AND KINGDOM (Leland de la Durantaye trans., 2010).  
 54. In Lord Bingham’s words, the very essence of the rule of law is that “all persons and 
authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the ben-
efits of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the 
courts.” TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 8 (Penguin 2010); see also BRIAN Z TAMANAHA, ON 
THE RULE OF LAW 35 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). According to the sociologist Seymour Mar-
tin Lipset, economic development, and in particular the economic effectiveness of the political 
system, rather than its law-applying and law-making procedures, is the principal “condition sus-
taining democracy.” In particular, while investigating the correlation between development and 
democracy, Lipset claimed that:  
[i]n the modern world . . . economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high 
educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society, is a basic condi-
tion sustaining democracy; it is a mark of the efficiency of the total system. But the stability of a 
given democratic system depends not only on the system’s efficiency in modernization, but also 
upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system. By effectiveness is meant the actual 
performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of govern-
ment as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of power-
ful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces. . . . Legitimacy 
involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing politi-
cal institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.  
Seymour M. Lipset, Social Requirements of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 86 (1959); see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 50, at 458–83. 
 55. Goodrich, Law’s Labour’s Lost, supra note 20, at 309. 
 56. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER 49–62 (Kevin Attell trans., Stanford Univ. Press 
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Consequently, in the global Oikoumene of total uniformity, there is no 
need for the Schmittian “exception” either: the sovereign (and thus, po-
litical) relationship between the law and those it tries to protect by im-
posing and/or stimulating its respect makes no appearance. 
Before turning to the intimate relationship between universalized 
liberalism and the manipulative use of comparative law’s geopolitics, I 
would like to specify that Schmitt claimed in 1922 that “[t]oday nothing 
is more modern than the onslaught against the political . . . [t]here must 
no longer be political problems, only organizational-technical and eco-
nomic-sociological tasks.”57 Seven years later, while arguing against 
what he called “liberal normativism,” Schmitt gave a compelling lecture 
in Barcelona on the essence, features, and perils of what he defined as 
the “the age of neutralization and depoliticization,” explaining why the 
“political” was in danger of disappearing as a human form of life be-
cause of the (terrible) fact that what he perceived as “sovereignty” was 
 
1998) (1995). The circumstance that even Lessig’s invisible software code needs to be drafted as 
a computer program by someone further demonstrates the law anthropological and ontological 
need for a tangible signature. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(Basic Books 1999). For a comparison between the current global order and the Schmittian model 
of Großraum power, see Siliquini-Cinelli, supra note 12. It is not the case that the dissolution of 
the legal force of the boundary coincided historically with the rise of the “social” – that is, in Ar-
endt’s words, “with the transformation of the private care for private property into a public con-
cern”; this took pace “when wealth became capital, whose chief function was to generate more 
capital.” This circumstance, and the “transformation of immobile property into mobile property” 
broadly understood, is of pivotal interest for our inquiry because “[t]he emergence of society . . . 
from the shadow interior of the household into the light of the public sphere, has not only blurred 
the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition 
the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizens.” 
See ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 53, at 68, 69, and 38. In this sense, it is worth 
mentioning that the global-order doctrine echoes two distinct historical moments of great im-
portance: (1) the Sophists’, and in particular Protagoras’s, polemic against nomos in favor of na-
ture, which led to the normativistic reinterpretation of nomos as mere “law” deprived of its spatial 
character (yet, while Schmitt would agree with the reconstruction, Heidegger would not); (2) the 
Stoic, and in particular Epictetus’s, understanding of “happiness” in terms of euroia biou, a meta-
phor that indicates, in Arendt’s words, “a free-flowing life, undisturbed by storms, tempests, or 
obstacles” and that allowed them to “withdraw from the world while still living it.” See Schmitt, 
Großraum Versus Universalism, supra note 53, at 67–83; ARENDT, supra note 45, at 74 and 92. 
Teubner’s claim for the invisible boundaries of global law that “are formed not by maintaining a 
core ‘territory’ and expanding on a ‘federal’ basis as Kant perceived in terms of nation-states, but 
rather ‘by invisible colleges’, ‘invisible markets and branches’, ‘invisible professional communi-
ties’, ‘invisible social networks’ that transcend territorial boundaries but nevertheless press for the 
emergence of genuinely legal forms” is therefore misleading because, strictly speaking, global 
(non-)law has no boundaries at all. See generally Teubner, supra note 36, at 7. See also ZENON 
BAŃKOWSKI AND MAKSYMILIAN DEL MAR, Images of Borders and the Politics of Legality and 
Identity, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY 61, 77 (Ashgate 2014). 
 57. POLITICAL ROMANTICISM, supra note 10, at 65. 
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no longer a constituent part of our world (Großraum).58 In particular, 
Schmitt argued that this depoliticization process involved four steps, 
“from the theological to the metaphysical domain, from there to the 
humanitarian-moral, and, finally, to the economic domain.”59 Liberal 
democracy and “political relativism”60 represent the final stage of this 
neutralizing trend. Schmitt built his considerations on Max Weber’s no-
tion of the “demagification of the world” (Entzauberung) and the sub-
sequent fight against the workings of bureaucracy as an instrumental 
and networked system of rational, and thus dehumanized relations.61 
As Tracy B. Strong writes in the foreword to Schmitt’s Political 
Theology, according to Weber, “[b]ureaucracy is the form of social or-
ganization that rests on norms and rules and not on persons.”62  It is thus 
a form of rule in which there is “objective discharge of business . . . ac-
cording to calculable rules and without regard of persons.”63 Important-
ly, although Schmitt insisted on a “sociology of concepts,” rather than a 
pure Weberian sociological approach, both Weber’s and Schmitt’s ac-
counts may be considered early objections to central texts of contempo-
rary liberalism, such as Rawls’s, A Theory of Justice.64 In this sense, it 
should be kept in mind that even Hayek criticized the constructivist es-
sence of the liberal global thought project. Hayek did so while analyz-
ing the paradoxes of the creation of the so-called “social and economic 
human rights” through a compelling analysis of Franklin D. Roose-
velt’s, four freedoms and the illusory content of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights 1948, which, according to Hayek, is based upon 
“the interpretation of society as a deliberatively made organization by 
which everybody is employed.”65 
 
 58. The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations, in THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, 
supra note 41, at 82. 
 59. Id. at 82. 
 60. POLITICAL ROMANTICISM, supra note 10, at 42. 
 61. Id. at xxiii,  
 62. Id. at xxii. 
 63. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 975 (Guenther Roth trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 
1968) (1956). 
 64. The Schmittian inevitable political division is precisely what liberalism has denied by 
denying the place of the decision. In particular, Schmitt’s account stands in opposition to Hayek’s 
belief that “[t]he basic source of social order . . . is not a deliberate decision to adopt certain 
common rules, but the existence among the people of certain opinions of what is right and 
wrong.” Consequently, “[t]he ultimate limit of power is . . . not somebody’s will on particular 
interests but . . . the concurrence of opinions among members of a particular territorial groups on 
rules of just conduct.” See HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 375–77. 
 65. Id. at 264. 
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III.  RATIONE IMPERII VERSUS IMPERIO RATIONIS 
A.  Comparative Law and the Liberal Global Order 
This paper’s second claim is that the instrumentalist use of com-
parative law’s geopolitics has become a powerful tool in the neutraliza-
tion of both the Schmittian “political” and “sovereign” pursued by the 
liberal global order project. To justify this claim, I contend that the in-
creasing importance of the comparative method in our era is mainly due 
to the fact that it makes it possible to reveal both the “general” and the 
“special” in the legal systems it analyzes. More precisely, in our neore-
alist global age, comparative law has become extremely useful for at 
least three reasons. First, “it helps to identify the circumstances in which 
law changes, hence it uncovers the causes of legal development.”66 Sec-
ond, “a uniform law cannot be achieved by simply conjuring up an ideal 
law on any topic.”67 Third, many examples of harmonization efforts that 
are preceded by a comparative survey exist.68 
In other words, even if the comparative approach has old origins,69 
its value as a study and methodology still is because it is rooted in social 
comparison, an activity through which “we make sense of the world in 
which we live and even understand ourselves.”70 Hence, comparative 
law is able to dissolve unconsidered national prejudices, thereby helping 
us to uncover how cultures are presented through examining their legal 
 
 66. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW ix (Univ. of Georgia 1991);  
see also CLASSICS IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Tom Ginsburg, Pier Giuseppe Monateri & Francesco 
Parisi eds., 2014); PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (3rd ed., 2007); 
OTTO KAHN FREUND, COMPARATIVE LAW AS AN ACADEMIC SUBJECT (Clarendon Press 1965); 
HAROLD C GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 1949); KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3rd 
ed., 1998).  
 67. Jan M. Smits, European Private Law and the Comparative Method, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO EUROPEAN UNION PRIVATE LAW 33, 34 (Christian Twigg-Flesner ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2010). 
 68. E.g. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 
11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. For an introduction, 
see MICHAEL BRIDGE, SALE OF GOODS (2nd ed , Oxford Univ. Press 2009); COMMENTARY ON 
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (Ingeborg H. Schwenzer ed. 
2010); INGEBORG H. SCHWENZER ET AL., GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2010). 
 69. When describing the polis as a peculiar isonomy, Herodotus defines for the first time the 
three chief forms of government (rule by one, rule by the few, and rule by the many) in BOOK III 
80–82. Later, both Plato and Aristotle compare the existing constitutions and forms of govern-
ment to determine which one was the best. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC BOOKS I-III (2nd ed., 
Hackett Classics 1992) (360 BCE). 
 70. David S. Clark, History of Comparative Law and Society, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
SOCIETY 1-36 (David S. Edward Elgar ed., 2012). 
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systems.71 Also, a comparative glance assists in furthering international 
understanding (Lipset used to say that an observer who knows only one 
country knows no countries).72 This is because the ideal task of the 
comparative legal scholar is to “be interested in the details of con-
sciousness, dismantling the various mechanisms of meaning production, 
and casting irony over interpretive practices.”73 
As the success of the New Approaches to Comparative Law 
(NACL) doctrine demonstrates,74 comparative law is increasingly gain-
ing international credibility as a way to develop new theories of sover-
eignty and governance in a framework where the law is perceived less 
as a positivistic set of rules and more as a symbolic vestimentum of 
global soft power. This growing perception is because of comparative 
law’s attractive functionalist or constructivist essence75 or, in other 
words, to the circumstance that, as claimed by two of the most promi-
nent comparatists, “[t]he basic methodological principle of all compara-
tive law . . . is that of functionality.”76 That is to say, comparative law 
may easily become an attractive device to achieve the desired result. 
Unfortunately, while comparative law has become a key discipline, 
its instrumentalist use has turned out to be a powerful weapon; it is the 
“pen” by which the identity of and differences in law’s geopolitics are 
continually written and rewritten.77 In other words, given that legal 
transplants can be directed not only at the positivistic content of the law, 
but also at the ways through which the content is created, destroyed, 
recreated, and generally administered, the impact of the comparative 
 
 71. Id.; COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg, Rosalind Dixon & Edward 
Elgar eds., 2011); H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE 
DIVERSITY IN LAW (4th ed., 2010); David S. Clark, Aims of Comparative Law, in ELGAR 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 57–65 (Jan M Smits ed., Edward Elgar Pub., 2006). 
 72. Lipset, supra note 54. 
 73. ‘Against Interpretation?’, supra note 2, at xix. 
 74. See Tamas Dezso Czigler, E-Consumer Protection in the U.S.– The Same Jungle as in 
Europe, 4 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 75. Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Methods in Comparative Law: An Intellectual Overview, 
in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7-24 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012); James Gordley, 
The Functional Method, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW: TRADITIONS AND 
TRANSITIONS 107-19 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012); Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist 
Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 100-30 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday 
eds.,2003); see also EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mark Van 
Hoecke ed., 2004); PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Maurice Adams & Jacco 
Bomhoff eds., 2010); MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW (2014). 
 76. ZWEIGERT AND KÖTZ, supra note 66, at 34; contra GLENN, supra note 71, at 7. 
 77. MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO, supra note 37. For a compelling introduction to 
the ‘perils’ of comparative law, see F H Lawson, The Field of Comparative Law 61 JURIDICAL 
REVIEW 16 (1949); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 10–15 (Univ. of Georgia Press 1993) 
(1974). 
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method of determining how cultures are mapped through the (legal) tra-
ditions that express them via definition of identities has become an issue 
that sociopolitical and legal scholars cannot take for granted anymore.78 
This is further demonstrated by the fact that the ideal essence of 
the comparative method is currently affected by the growing use of 
“benchmarking and numeric calculus of performance by world institu-
tional actors.”79 In this way, through the adoption of a sterile and neutral 
methodology to which is attributed universal value because it over-
comes the historicity of understanding and the anthropological compo-
nent of the legal discourse,80 the sovereign individual who acts is ex-
cluded from the law’s performative domain and replaced by the 
apolitical individual who behaves.81 Thus, given the similarities between 
the world order pursued by the global governance project and Grei-
masian totalizing structuralism,82 the increasing development of dehu-
manized arithmetical calculation (as well as legal language based on 
mechanical, and thus neutral, economic models) to support distortive 
theories of comparative law should lead us to take into pivotal account 
that “[t]he first essential step on the road to total domination is to kill 
the juridical person.”83 
 
 78. See generally PETER BIRKS, MAPPING THE LAW (Andrew Burros & Alan Roger eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press,2006); PETER BIRKS, STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW 
(Charles E.F. Rickett & Ross Grantham eds., Hart 2008); PETER BIRKS, THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
OBLIGATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press, 1997); MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO, supra note 
37; GEOFFREY SAMUEL, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMON LAW 103-04 (Edward Elgar 
ed., 2013) (2014); STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:  CATEGORIES AND 
CONCEPTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003); Peter 
Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 1 (1996); 
Darryn Jensen, The Problem of Classification in Private Law, 31 MELB. U. L. REV. 516 (2007); 
Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Can the Common Law Be Mapped?, 55 U. TORONTO L. J. 271 (2005); Igor 
Stramignoni, Review Essay: Categories and Concepts: Mapping Maps in Western Legal Thought, 
1 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 411 (2012). 
 79. Horatia Muir Watt, Further Terrains for Subversive Comparison: The Field of Global 
Governance and the Public/Private Law Divide, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Pier 
Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012) 270, 273. 
 80. SUPIOT, supra note 20, at 59–77, 84–86, 94–109.  
See also ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE (1996); LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE 
LAW (2002); LEGALISM (Paul Dresch & Hannah Skoda eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012); Elizabeth 
Mertz and Mark Goodale, Comparative Anthropology of Law, in DAVID CLARK, COMPARATIVE 
LAW AND SOCIETY: RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Elgar, ed., 2012). 
 81. Ranke and Gadamer would agree with this, while Lévi-Strauss, whose intent was to cre-
ate an all-encompassing science of communication that would include genetics, linguistics, and 
anthropology, would probably not. 
 82. For two recent accounts of how to deal with global legal pluralism, see KEITH C. 
CULVER & MICHAEL GIUDICE, LEGALITY’S BORDERS: AN ESSAY IN GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2010); PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). 
 83. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 447 (1973). 
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In this regard, in addition to the Doing Business reports, the draft-
ing of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) represents an-
other useful example of how the comparative method can be used to 
neutralize the geopolitical relationship between the law’s performative 
instances and those who live under its empire.84 Unfortunately, by fo-
cusing solely on the positivistic dimensions and business implications of 
the PECL, private law scholars have never understood that providing a 
sterile set of principles through a mere comparison of national private 
law rules (and of those norms contained in the UNIDROIT Principles) 
annihilates both the political sensibility and sociology behind private 
law rules. This demonstrates that the PECL’s drafters have produced the 
maximum expression of how the formal “depoliticization” and “dejurid-
ification” pursued by the global-order project has negatively affected 
private legal reasoning on the continent.85 
The significance of the PECL within the geopolitics of compara-
tive law can also be shown by the reformation of the Israeli Civil Code, 
which is unusual, because Israel’s is a hybrid legal order.86 Throughout 
the recodification project, reference was made to the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples or the PECL.87 Similarly, another example of the power and im-
portance of comparative law in the shaping of national legal rules is the 
modernization of the German law of obligations.88 The rules as they are 
now are the result of the influence of various forces including foreign 
law, comparisons between national legal cultures, references to interna-
tional conventions, and model rules (such as the UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the PECL, and the 
 
 84. THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW, pts. 1 & 2 (Hugh Beale & Ole Lando eds., 2000). See also OLE LANDO ET AL., 
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, pt. 3 (2003).  
I agree with Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut when they claim that “[t]he European Unification 
process is . . . very much built on the traditional constructivist ambitions of comparative law.” 
Maurice Adams & Dirk Hheirbaut, Prologomena to the Method and Culture of Comparative 
Law, in THE METHOD AND CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Maurice Adams & Dirk Hheirbaut 
eds., Hart Publ’g 2014). 
 85. INGERID S. STRAUME & JOHN F. HUMPHREY, Introduction to DEPOLITICIZATION THE 
POLITICAL IMAGERY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 10 (Ingerid S. Straume & John F. Humphrey eds., 
NSU Press 2010). 
 86. Antonios E. Platsas, The Enigmatic but Unique Nature of the Israeli Legal System, 15 
POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 11, 15 (2012). 
 87. Pablo Lerner & Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, A Civil Code for a Mixed Jurisdiction. 
Some Remarks on the Israeli Approach to Codification, in LEGAL CULTURES AND LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS GENERAL REPORTS TO THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 9-10 (Jorge A Sánchez Cordero ed., 2010). 
 88. Peter Schlechtriem, The German Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations in the Context 
of Common Principles and Structures of the Law of Obligations in Europe, OXFORD U. COMP. L. 
FORUM (2002), available at http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/schlechtriem2.shtml#fn1anc. 
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UNIDROIT Principles).89 
The foregoing should be investigated bearing in mind that, while 
comparative law has always been directly or indirectly part of the judi-
cial process,,90 its instrumentalist use can influence the outcome of na-
tional court cases.  This trend demonstrates full well the extent of the 
impact of the global-order project over classic, state-based hierarchical 
systems of legal authority. Its effects in terms of geopolitical and cultur-
al signification should not, therefore, be taken for granted. For example, 
Lord Cooke of Thordon claimed, “the common law of England is be-
coming gradually less English [because] [i]nternational influences – 
from Europe, the Commonwealth and even the United States . . . are 
gradually acquiring more and more strength.”91In addition, with respect 
to EU law, article 340 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union deals with the liability of the EU for damage caused by its 
servants in the performance of their duties. The treaty explicitly refers 
to the “principles common to . . . the Member States.”92 Yet these prin-
ciples (and EU private law, broadly understood) are somewhat elusive, 
and mostly, not really tangible (as is usually the case with supra-
national phenomena). Not surprisingly, they are to be defined ad nutum 
by the European Union’s Court of Justice through the instrumentalist 
use of the comparative method.93 Finally, the drafting of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was also influenced by the indi-
vidualization of what have been described as the “common” traditions 
and experiences of various European countries.94 This is a circumstance 
we ought not to underestimate. On the one hand, national supreme 
 
 89. André Janssen & Reiner Schulze, Legal Cultures and Legal Transplants in Germany, 2 
EUROPEAN REV. PRIVATE LAW 225, 238 (2011). 
 90. GUY CANIVET, ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW BEFORE THE COURTS (2004); BASIL S 
MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE COURTROOM AND CLASSROOM, 147-150 (Hart Pub-
lishing 2000); BASIL S. MARKESINIS & JOERG FEDTKE, ENGAGING WITH FOREIGN LAW (Hart 
Publishing 2009); Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve, Intent on Making Mischief: Seven Ways 
of Using Comparative Law, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 25-60 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri 
ed., 2012); T.T. Arvind, The ‘Transplant Effect’ in Harmonization 1 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 65, 66-
7 (2010). 
 91. Robin Cooke, The Road Ahead for the Common Law, in TOM BINGHAM AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LAW: A LIBER AMICORUM 688-89 (Mads Andenas and Duncan Fair-
grieve eds., 2009). 
 92. Consolidated Version of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 326/ 50, art. 
340, 2012 O.J. 193. 
 93. Case 17-74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European 
Cmtys., 1974  E.C.R 01063.  See also Kathleen Gutman, The Evolution of the Action for Damag-
es Against the European Union and Its Place in the System of Judicial Protection, 48 COMMON 
MARKET L. REV. 695 (2011). 
 94. Paivi Leino, A European Approach to Human Rights Universality Explored, 71 NORDIC 
J. INT’L L., 455, 456 (2002). 
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courts are increasingly referring to the judgments delivered by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) to direct their reasoning.95On 
the other hand, the ECtHR has claimed the “authority to review even 
constitutional provisions. . . to assess their compatibility with the [EC-
tHR].”96 Yet a real understanding of what Europe and the EU are, and 
what being a European signifies, is anything but beyond dispute. This is 
demonstrated by the “Europeanisation of Europe” being a “top-down” 
legitimizing political process rather than a ‘bottom-up’ one. These 
rights have always been conferred from above as a benefit, rather than 
exacted from below as a demand.97 
What these examples prove is that, in dealing with the ideal es-
sence of the comparative method and the anthropological and biopoliti-
cal human need for the law’s performative instances, what makes the 
difference is how the guardians of a legal tradition decide to deal with 
its geopolitical and ontological signatures is critically important.98 
B.  Two Possible Reasons Behind the Distortive Use of Comparative 
Law’s Geopolitics 
One way to explain the foregoing is that European academics are 
usually based at state universities and, even though their activity may be 
protected by the (constitutional) guarantee of "academic freedom", the 
survival of a significant amount of scholarship depends on the funding 
provided by international institutions, as well as global and transnation-
al actors, to carry out projects whose guidelines are a priori determined. 
Arguably, this compromises the effectiveness of academic and institu-
tional autonomy.99 
I believe, however, that there is another reason behind the instru-
mentalist turn that comparative law and legal reasoning have experi-
enced. I refer particularly to the artificial birth of the Leviathan, which 
has led to the positivist dictum that has rendered “law” synonymous 
with “legislation,” or in other words, to the victory of the concept that 
law is a purely political instrument of the rational order (or raison 
 
 95. See Cadder v. HM Advocate. [2010] UKSC 43, (Scot.), in which Lord Hope made refer-
ence to several judicial decisions through which the national law in France and Ireland was al-
tered for the purpose of satisfying the well-known Salduz judgment. 
 96. Yaniv Rozani, The Theory and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitu-
tional Amendments, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557 (2013). 
 97. See generally Luca Siliquini-Cinelli and Bétrice Schütte, supra note 42.  
 98. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, SIGNATURA RERUM (Bollati Boringhieri ed., 2008); THE 
KINGDOM AND THE GLORY (Lorenzo Chiesa trans., Stanford Univ. Press ed., 2011) (2007). 
 99. CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES 73 
(George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2008) (1938). 
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d’état) imposed by the ruler.100 This revolutionary break has deprived 
jurists of their role as guardians of the law’s uncanny presence. With the 
exception of Germany, the birth of the modern European nation-state as 
an artificial and political creature has monopolized political action and 
restricted jurists to a reductive role, completely opposed to the prestig-
ious role they had during the Middle Ages and Renaissance. In this 
sense, it is not surprising that the spread of theories and methods of 
comparative law aimed at transcending the political dominium of the 
Leviathan as a technically completed magnum-artificium (or magnus 
homo) took place alongside the so-called “international institutionaliza-
tion of comparative law,” which officially began with the constitutive 
meeting of the Académie International de Droit Comparé in Geneva in 
1924.101 Its main achievements were obtained during the post-World 
Word II period, particularly between 1949 and 1951 by American and 
European comparatists.102 
The discovery and consequent application of the first paragraph of 
Justinian’s Digest led the medieval glossators in a revolutionary move 
to displace the divine figure of the king and his dual function as “lord” 
and “minister of justice” (from ratione Imperii to imperio rations)103 It 
was the discovery of the Digest that made it possible for the law to be 
taught and studied in the West as an independent science in the late 
1000s and 1100s.104 This is how what Goodrich has defined as the ‘first 
revolution in interpretation’ took place.105  As Berman correctly writes, 
“[t]he law that was first taught and studied systematically . . . was not 
the prevailing law; it was the law contained in an ancient manuscript 
which had come to light in an Italian library toward the end of the elev-
 
 100.  Id. 
 101. Clark, History of Comparative Law and Society, supra note 70 at 28. 
 102. Id. at 29–31. While inquiring comparatists’ discomfort with politics, David Kennedy has 
defined this trend, and its need for neutrality, in terms of a reaction to the “post-war trauma.” See 
David W. Kennedy, The Politics and Methods of Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES 345–437 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds.,2003). On why and how this trend 
recalls the pre-positivistic approach of the natural lawyers, see James Gordley, The Universalist 
Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 31-45 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday 
eds.,2003). For a critique of the “allegation that traditional comparative law obeys a secret politi-
cal agenda of hegemony and domination,” see Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke Comparative 
Law Beyond Post-Modernism, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 800 (2000). 
 103. Intersititium and Non-Law, supra note 20 at 213.  
 104. For discussion of the idea that law began to be taught as a distinct science in the 1000s 
and 1100, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION (Harvard Univ. Press 1983). 
 105. Goodrich, supra note 20 at 303; see also Intersititium and Non-Law, supra note 20 at 
213.   
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enth century. The manuscript reproduced” the Digest.106 This is why, in 
commenting on Maitland’s considerations, Berman writes that the 
twelfth century was not a legal century but the legal century, “the centu-
ry in which the Western legal tradition was born.”107 Notwithstanding 
the subordination of reason (and mind, broadly understood) to theolo-
gy,108 Andrea da Isernia’s Latin locution “raro principes iurista inveni-
tur”109 proves that it was in those crucial years, and not before, that the 
idea emerged on the continent that law’s mythical essence is “holy” and 
those who deal with it should be scientists whose dominium over the 
law’s performative instances allows them to gather together and consti-
tute a new, separated holy corpus, namely the militia legum (or militia 
literata or, as Baldus defined it, militia doctoralis), to be ontologically 
compared to the militia coelestis of the Church and the armed aristocrat-
ic militia of the nobles (Sir Edward Coke, who claimed that the 
commfon law is the embodiment of the reasoning of many generations 
of learned men, would not agree with that).110 This is probably one of 
the most powerful demonstrations that the law is the product of both the 
norm and decision. 
However, the constructivist creation of the nation-state confined 
the imperio rationis and sovereign will of the continental jurist to a pas-
sive role by bringing back the mystic dimension of the ratione Imperii 
to the supreme level of law’s annunciation and administration.111 The 
 
 106. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 121-22 (Harvard Univ. Press 1983). 
 107. Id. at 120. 
 108. CHARLES WEBSTER, FROM PARACELSUS TO NEWTON: MAGIC AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN SCIENCE (Dover Publications 2005)(1982); SUPIOT, supra note 20, at 51-52. 
 109. CRISTINA CONSTANTINI, LA LEGGE E IL TEMPIO: STORIA COMPARATA DELLA 
GIUSTIZIA INGLESE (Carocci 2007). 
 110. The fact that, in his INSTITUTES, Coke claimed that the common law is “nothing but rea-
son” should not confuse the interpreter. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 18th ed. 1999). Given what is stated in 
John 1:1 (Ἐνἀρχῇἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγοςἦν πρὸςτὸνθεόν, καὶ θεὸςἦν ὁ λόγος’), according to both 
the scholastic and humanist legal philosophers, reason is a natural faculty of the human mind giv-
en by God. Thus reason is not, as Coke understood it, the specialist feature of those ‘grave and 
learned men’ of English law. In Berman’s words, “for Coke, the artificial reason of the English 
common law was the unique reason, logic, sense, and purposes of the historically rooted law of 
the English nation, a repository of the thinking and experience of the English common lawyers 
over many centuries.” See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE 
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 243 (Belknap Press of Har-
vard Univ. Press 2006). Coke’s notion of both the common law and the Common law was accept-
ed and developed further by Sir Matthew Hale, the creator of the historical theory of jurispru-
dence, which profoundly influenced Hayek’s thoughts on how law rises, evolves, and eventually 
dies. The fact that Hobbes considered Coke’s conception to be false and misleading is the key to 
understand the essence of the political dicta of the Leviathan over legal reasoning. Id. at 257–60. 
 111. See generally Schmitt, Großraum Versus Universalism, supra note 53.  
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state, through its officials, became the only guardian of law’s uncanny 
presence and legal reasoning. From being the active protagonist of the 
stage, jurists figuratively became the passive part of the audience. Quot-
ing Hayek’s account of the role of the lawyer in political evolution, ju-
rists became “an unwitting tool, a link in a chain of events that [they do] 
not see as a whole.”112 Kelsen’s closing statements in Pure Theory of 
Law demonstrate this shift well. According to Kelsen, who was a neo-
Kantian student of Rudolf Stammler, law is nothing other than the nor-
mative (self-supporting) domain of the state, and only the state’s offi-
cials (among whom stands the judge) are entitled to decide what falls 
within the law’s purview and what does not113 (Schmitt, who insisted 
that “all law is situational law”114 would not agree with that.) In the light 
of legal positivism’s political sin, this means that there is no space for 
what is not realized, spoken, and written by the state (the word of the 
state is eternal, all else is fleeting), because, in Schmitt’s words, all law 
“is simultaneously a problem of the existence of the state order”.115 
Hence, it is no longer believed that “what is non-legal is always neces-
sary to make law properly legal.”116 
To understand this shift fully, one should note that it was in the 
modern age, and not before, that the mechanistic philosophy of nature 
as the tool of self-assertion was adopted.117 The fact that the individual, 
and thus will as opposed to reason, makes no appearance in that which 
is freed from any metaphysical reference such as scientific laws118 is 
therefore anything but a coincidence. 
Consequently, under the imperative will and dominium politicum 
et regale of the sovereign Leviathan,119 civilian lawyers could no longer 
be considered the guardians of law’s uncanny presence. Liberalism, fo-
cused on norms rather than power, and whose “horizon of explanation is 
framed by reason . . . and personal well-being”120 rather than will, is 
aimed at eliminating the personal from the concept of law, has played a 
 
 112. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 66. 
 113. See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cali-
fornia, Berkley ed., 1976). 
 114. POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 4, at 13. 
 115. Id. at 26. 
 116. COSTAS DOUZINAS, RONNIE WARRINGTON & SHAUN MCVEIGH, POSTMODERN 
JURISPRUDENCE 26 (Routledge 1993). 
 117. HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE 151 (Robert M. Wallace 
trans., MIT Press Paperback ed., 1985). 
 118. WEBSTER, supra note 109; see also OUT OF EDEN, supra note 12, at 33-35. 
 119. The Hobbesian sovereign is, it should be noted, the only one to preserve the features of 
the state of nature in terms of ius contra omnes. See SCHMITT, supra note 101.  
 120. OUT OF EDEN, supra note 12, at 53. 
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significant role in taking this shift farther.121 Given the role that the 
normative thinking of the liberal tradition has played in this process, it 
is truly astounding that the drastic, manipulative change of the concept 
of law and of legal reasoning was first fully spotted in 1973 by Hayek, 
who vehemently claimed that “if the principles which at present guide 
[this] process are allowed to work themselves out to their logical conse-
quences, law as we know it as the chief protection of the freedom of the 
individual is bound to disappear.”122 
Notwithstanding his critique of Schmitt, and thus of the sover-
eign’s particularistic will in law and legal reasoning,123 Hayek warned us 
about the perils of a dimension in which legal thinking is (instrumental-
ly) governed “to such an extent by new conception of the functions of 
law”124 that its evolution would (sadly) lead to the transformation of the 
system of abstract rules of just conduct into a system of mere rules of 
organization. To justify his claim, he maintained that 
“[f]rom the conception that legislation is the sole source of law 
derive two ideas . . . the first of these is the belief that there 
must be a supreme legislator whose power cannot be limited, 
because this would require a still higher legislator, and so on in 
an infinite regress. The other is that anything laid down by the 
supreme legislator is law and only that which expresses his 
will is law.”125 
To recap, the modern European nation-state, with the exception of 
Germany where universities maintained an effective role due to the ab-
sence of a unitary political model of state power,126 has monopolized po-
litical action and restricted continental jurists to a reductive role com-
pletely opposed to the prestigious one they filled during the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance. As lawyers, we ought not to take the theoretical 
dimensions and practical consequences of this revolution for grant-
ed.Being an ideal object, law always needs a corpus to show and prove 
 
 121. Kahn correctly notes that liberalism’s task may have its historical origins in the political 
efforts to free law from the king. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE 
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 12 at 5, 79, 132–37. 
 122. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 64. 
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 124. Id. at 64. 
 125. Id. at 87. The greatest promoters of this idea were Bodin, Bacon, Hobbes, and Austin. 
 126. The German exception has been carefully analyzed by MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL 
DIRITTO, supra note 37. For an introduction, see INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN THE AGE OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT (Morigiwa Yasutomo, Michael Stolleis, & Jean-Louis Halpérin eds., Springer 
2011). See also JAMES GORDLEY, THE JURISTS  (Oxford Univ. Press 2013). 
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its historical existence.127 Thus, in relation to the revolutionary process 
of insular signification of politics and law as expressed by the Schmitti-
an link between localization (Ortung) and ordering (Ordnung), the new 
Leviathan, an exceptional creature to the Holy Roman Empire, needed a 
visible and tangible platform of ontological recognition and legitima-
tion.128 Such a platform was finally found in both the national constitu-
tions and codes, whose aim was to protect the Civil law tradition in its 
various localizations through instrumentalist and constructivist ap-
proaches to law’s sublimity.129 Just as the noun “sculpture” needs a stat-
ue to present itself in a visible and tangible entity, the new artificial lo-
cal nomos became nothing more than a “positive object” (or 
construction, or fact) that lacked any transcendent normative signifi-
cance. 
The foregoing may help our understanding of why it is possible to 
argue that the modern dimension of the Civil law tradition is composed 
of a particular mix of methods of education and instruction, as well as a 
narration of historical facts and memories. What legal scholarship un-
derwent during the artificial creation of the continental nation-state was 
not just a change in its size (from being Commune Europaeum, as it be-
came after the Corpus Juris was discovered, to being individualistic and 
encapsulated in the political dominium of the new local sovereign),130 
but also in its essence and purposes. The inevitable consequence of the 
revolutionary “aspatial turn” undergone by law and legal reasoning was 
that their tangible representations began to be instrumentally adminis-
tered by politicians and bureaucrats to achieve contingent sociopolitical 
results, rather than to preserve their essence.131 
In this way, the juris periti of continental Europe (with the excep-
tion of Germany) lost the leading role they had during the Middle Ages 
and Renaissance, and became mere officials of the sovereign state’s 
longa manus (that is to say, of the parliament and judiciary).132 
The artificial action of the modern continental European nation-
state conceived by the constructivist, intentional approach to both soci-
opolitical and legal thought thus posed a genealogical-anthropological 
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problem for legal scholarship because the European nation-state forced 
legal scholarship to lose its guiding role (and prestige) as militia legum. 
Jurists went from being the custodians of law’s uncanny presence, fos-
tered by the activity of such academics as Irnerius, who studied and 
taught the Holy Roman Empire’s “corpus juris”,133 to being neutral tools 
of a process of events that they neither led nor saw as a whole.134 As a 
consequence, it became necessary to completely rethink the notion and 
essence of the jurisprudentia in terms that were unknown until that 
moment. The modern and positivistic dimension of law brought about 
by secularization meant that law and the law-making and law-decision 
processes became products of the affirmation of the rational voluntas of 
the “political” in Schmittian terms. All over Europe, law ceased to be 
the revelation of a ratio juris, or science of justice, discovered and 
taught by a few juris periti, and became synonymous with legislation as 
product of the deliberative will of the constituted political ruler (aucto-
ritas non veritas facit legem).135 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Comparative law usually refers to the positivistic comparison of 
two or more legal systems, or the laws of those systems, on a particular 
issue. Its aim, it is usually maintained, is to find similarities or differ-
ences among various targeted legal systems. Yet, as this paper contends, 
comparative law is anything but about “taking pictures” and both its of-
ficial and “occult” essences may also play an important role in the for-
mation or destruction of a spatial (and, thus, geopolitical) ontology. This 
means that if we decide to apply Spencer Brown’s logico-mathematical 
model to cultural constructions and distinctions,136 comparative law may 
turn out to be a powerful tool for both protecting and neutralizing the 
anthropological and sociopolitical space between them. 
Importantly, the practice of dissolution of boundaries finds a valu-
able ally in the misleading belief, in Hyland’s words, that “all developed 
societies confront the same problems.”137 In this regard, to fully under-
stand McEvoy’s claim that one day, “it will be paradoxical to argue 
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against the harmonization and even the unification of the laws around 
the globe: legally, here will be everywhere,”138 it should first be under-
stood that the instrumentalist use of comparative law’s geopolitics is re-
lated to the fact that the notion of a spatial (and, thus, geopolitical) on-
tology is highly controversial. This is why, given the existential link 
between textual representation and legal domain, it is reasonable to ar-
gue that the double-faceted nature of law (that is, its practical discourse 
and theoretical ideal, as described by Peter Goodrich139) is constantly at 
stake when the comparative method is used to administer the geopoliti-
cal signature of law’s regulative instances. 
Delving into this perspective, the foregoing has claimed that the 
manipulative use of comparative law’s geopolitics seems to be aimed at 
overcoming the political monopoly of legal reasoning as imposed by the 
artificial birth of the Leviathan. In fact, this distortive view of compara-
tive law appears to be in line with the doctrine aimed at creating the 
“aspatial” and intangible sociopolitical, juridical and economic global 
order that transcends the current state’s political imposition and onto-
logical dimensions. The deliberative law-making process brought about 
by the French Revolution and its constructivist rationalism are the ob-
stacle to overcome, and the “cohabitation” of different national legal 
systems the problem to solve. If, as Arendt has persuasively claimed, 
the anthropological function of positive law is “to erect boundaries and 
establish channels of communication between men whose community is 
continually endangered by the new men born into it,”140 then it is quite 
evident that what the liberal global-order project challenges is the de-
limiting constitutive force of the boundary, and thus of traditions. The 
fact that the global spatial turn that legal and sociopolitical theories are 
undergoing is aimed at overcoming the classic idea of space, as a repre-
sentative surface, is testament to this.141 The intangible “open”,142 or He-
 
 138. SEBASTION MCEVOY, DESCRIPTIVE AND PURPOSIVE CATEGORIES OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 144-65 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri 2012). 
 139. PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW 108–09 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson eds., 1990); 
see also LAW AND IMAGE (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1999). 
 140. ARENDT, supra note 66, at 465. 
 141. For an introduction to this topic, see FRANZ VON BENDA-BECKMANN & KEEBET VON 
BENDA-BECKMANN ET. AL, SPATIALIZING LAW (Ashgate 2009); HARM DE BLIG, THE POWER OF 
PLACE (Oxford Univ. Press 2011); HARM DE BLIJ, WHY GEOGRAPHY MATTERS (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2nd ed. 2012); Pietro Costa, Uno ‘Spatial Turn’ Per La Storia Del Diritto? Una Rassegna 
Tematica (A ‘Spatial Turn’ for Legal History? A Tentative Assessment), Max Planck Institute for 
European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 07, 2013.  
 142. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE OPEN: MAN AND ANIMAL (Kevin Attell trans., Stanford Univ. 
Press 2004) (2002). 
SILIQUINI-CINELLI_FINAL_FOR_PUB 2/24/2016  2:07 PM 
2015] The Age of ‘Depoliticisation’ and ‘Dejuridification’ 243 
gelo-Marxist post-historical dimension,143 with its formal apolitical and 
legally neutral essence and instable non-substance, is what rests in front 
of us (with the understanding that hen kai pan – all is one144). 
In an age in which, as Supiot noted, “[t]ime . . . must be a homog-
enous and quantifiable given [and] space must be continuous, cleared of 
any obstacle to the free circulation of goods, workers and capital,”145 the 
“global governance-distortive comparative law” alliance has made it 
easier to “discover” the land of the figuratively unspoken and unwritten 
as the smooth and rectilinear territory that lies over what is created by 
the constructivist political interventions of the modern nation-state and 
where exceptions, or miracles, are no longer needed. The next phase 
(which is currently taking place) will be about forcing the global-order 
citizens to live in the totalizing Oikoumene, that is the “aspatial” and in-
tangible terra incognita (to be intended as a new manifestation of Des-
cartes’s terra firma146) in which spaces and identities are innocent and 
indifferent because they have been annihilated by the leveling and con-
formist demands of the global (open) society.147 What Huntington de-
scribes as the “increased salience of cultural identity”148 is anything but 
a spontaneous reaction to this trend of dissolution. 
In addition to Mathias M. Siems’ claim that comparative law will 
inevitably be irrelevant in an age of totalitarian transnational conver-
gence,149 I perceive two other perils behind the universalization of liber-
al thought and its alliance with the manipulative use of comparative 
law’s geopolitics. 
First, the world is mainly shaped and characterized by its sociolo-
gy of law, historicity of politics, and logic of memory. The practical ap-
plication of any theory that transcends the ontological and cultural di-
mensions of the world’s spatiality will turn out to be more painful than 
any legal or sociopolitical scholar could ever imagine.150 
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The second peril is related to the paradox of the methodology used 
by those comparative legal scholars who support the WTO’s global rev-
olution. In trying to reclaim the active role that the French Revolution 
and the Leviathan’s artificial birth deprived them, legal scholars are us-
ing comparative law and legal reasoning in the same revolutionary way 
that was spread by constructivist rationalism to create, destroy, and rec-
reate the sociopolitical and legal order for instrumentalist purposes. In 
other words, the promoters of the universalized liberalism are using the 
same constructivist methodology prompted by the Legendrian “logic of 
assembling,” which inevitably implies an a priori deconstruction, and 
through which the political has imposed its will over a given territory. 
The only difference in this recursive Machiavellian trend lies in its cur-
rent functionalist, apolitical, and legally neutral form. 
To conclude, the lesson to be learned from the nullification of Ho-
mo juridicus is that, instead of acting in the way described in this paper, 
comparative lawyers should dedicate their efforts to discovering the 
“unofficial” or figuratively “impossible” which lies behind the objects 
of their inquiries. This should be done by combining traditional notions 
and unexplored conceits of law and legal reasoning through a multi-
disciplinary approach capable of understanding how cultures are not on-
ly “mapped” through the legal traditions that express them via definition 
of identities, but also how they are contaminated by distortive “process-
es of meaning production as social and political realities.”151 
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